suggest, a subject has to be able to engage in, if we are to credit her with causal concepts. I also point out that this type of reasoning turns on the idea of a physical connection between cause and effect, as articulated in recent singularist approaches of causation.
Thick Causal Concepts
Elizabeth Anscombe's inaugural lecture 'Causality and Determination' is often seen as a paradigmatic statement of what has become known as singularism about 1 See the next section for the relevance of this distinction. pushing, wetting, etc., in virtue of which the subject can count as thinking of these instances in genuinely causal terms. For, intuitively, what her story leaves out is precisely what it is in virtue of which the subject understands that these are all forms of causing something. 4 To make the issue I have in mind more concrete, it might help to consider two studies on children's understanding of causation carried out by Gelman, Bullock, and Meck (1980) , and by Das Gupta and Bryant (1989) , respectively. In Gelman et al.'s study, children were shown two pictures of an object, depicting the object before and after it had undergone a causal transformation (e.g. a picture of an apple and a picture of a wet apple), and they had to choose from an array of pictures of objects (e.g. a towel, a knife, a water jug) the right one to bring about the relevant transformation.
Gelman et al. found that 3-year-olds were able to match objects to outcomes, and, conversely, were also able to match outcomes to objects.
Das Gupta and Bryant's (1989) study seems, on the face of it, only slightly more complex, but achieved rather different results. In this study, children again had to choose from an array of pictures of objects the right one to complete a sequence of three pictures, but this time the first picture in the sequence showed an object that had already undergone a causal transformation. Thus, the first picture might, for instance, be of a cut apple, and the last of a wet and cut apple. Das Gupta and Bryant tested both 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds and found that only the latter reliably succeeded in the task, whereas the former failed. Now, Anscombe's claim was that there are types of causation that are observable, and that there is a class of concepts, thick concepts, which can be applied on the basis of such observation without knowledge of a relevant general causal claim. The issue that Das Gupta and Bryant's findings seem to make pressing, though, is how these two claims are related to each other. For it seems plausible to explain 3-year-olds' ability to pass Gelman et al.'s task by saying that they have seen instances of the relevant causal transaction before, and, on that basis, possess a type of knowledge that can guide selection of an object suitable for bringing about a certain result. Yet, Das Gupta and Bryant's study suggests that this type of knowledge is, as it were, quite piecemeal, and does not equip the children with the ability to engage in certain, rather basic, forms of inferential reasoning about causal relations. And, at least on the face of it, this should hold us back from ascribing to the children concepts of the relevant causal relations, because it is concepts that are required for inferential reasoning.
It might be useful to note a parallel between the issue I have just sketched and a similar issue that arises in connection with the relationship between shape perception and shape concepts. In 'Things without the mind', Gareth Evans writes:
[I]t does not seem to be possible to regard the conception of the shape of a material thing -with all the propositions about its characteristic behaviour and interaction with other bodies which that implies -as the same as whatever shape concepts might be grounded in the colour mosaic thought to be given in immediate visual experience (Evans, 1985, p. 270 ).
Evans does not mean to deny, here, that shape properties can be perceived. Rather, his point is that our grasp of what it is for an object to be round, for instance, cannot be explained simply in terms of an ability to recognize perceptually instances in which that property is instantiated. Instead, such a grasp requires that one "master a set of interconnected principles which make up an elementary theory" (ibid., p. 269) into which the relevant property fits.
A somewhat similar line of thought can be found in John Campbell (1995) , who contrasts two different types of representation of shape, which differ according to the types of operations that can be performed on them.
At the level of perception we have representations which are involved in imagistic reasoning: the rotations and zooms with which Shepard and others have made us familiar. And these representations are used in guiding action.
Even an animal incapable of conceptual thought can engage in perceptually guided action. At the conceptual level we have representations which are involved in deductive reasoning: reasoning involving the application of the laws of logic. […] To have a shape concept is to be able to form representations of shape which can figure in deductive reasoning (Campbell, 1995, p. 362) .
Intuitively, the findings on children's developing understanding of causation mentioned above suggest that we need to make a similar kind of distinction between two types of reasoning, and correspondingly two types of representation, in the case of causal relations. Perceptually-based imagistic reasoning abilities may be sufficient to pass Gelman et al.'s task, whereas Das Gupta and Bryant's task may require deductive reasoning involving conceptual thought about causal relations.
To make good such a suggestion, we need to say more about what might be the distinguishing features of reasoning that involves the use of causal concepts, and show how these features are present in Das Gupta and Bryant's task. I will return to this issue in the final section of this paper. Before doing so, however, I want to turn to quite a different type of philosophical work on causation and show that it actually raises the same type of issue that I have just discussed in connection with Anscombe's account, though in a slightly different guise.
Causal Models
In several recent papers, Christopher Hitchcock has extolled the virtues of causal models as tools for representing causal relationships (see, e.g., Hitchcock, 1995 Hitchcock, , 2001 Hitchcock, , 2007 . Causal models, which were originally developed in areas such as epidemiology and artificial intelligence (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour & Scheines, 2000) , typically consist in a directed graph, identifying a number of variables that are connected by directed edges ('arrows'), and an accompanying set of structural equations, which specify the exact nature of the connection between variables. As such, they can be used to represent what is often called the causal structure of a given physical system by making explicit (often quite intricate) patterns of counterfactual dependence holding between different variables in the system. One important reason why Hitchcock is interested in causal models is that he thinks that, depending on context, common-sense judgements about causation typically focus only on one or another subset of the counterfactual relationships that hold in a given causal scenario, and using causal models can thus help us disambiguate such judgements. There has also been increasing interest, however, in the connected idea that a basic form of mental representation governing causal learning embodies a causal model. In other words, the thought is that we can explain certain features of causal learning by postulating cognitive structures that represent causal structure in the manner of a causal model.
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For the purposes of this paper, this latter idea is of particular interest because, as a device for representing causal relations, causal models might be seen to possess one feature that Anscombe's account seemed to have difficulties providing for. Note that there appears to be a straightforward, and general, answer to the question as to though, I will assume that it can be made good.
Rather, I will focus on another feature of causal models that Hitchcock (2007, p. 510) himself notes: Just like Anscombe's thick causal concepts, they can be used to capture both singular and general causal relationships. In this respect, causal models bear some resemblance to another sort of representation, namely maps.
6 Perhaps we typically think of maps as representations of particular places, because we take as our paradigm geographical maps, which do represent particular places, but there are also 5 Cf., e.g., Glymour (2001) , Gopnik et al. (2004) . 6 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some theorists therefore also talk of 'causal maps' (see, e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004) . Another type of representation which shares this feature are scripts as described originally by Shank & Abelson (1972) , and as explored in detail in developmental psychology by Nelson (1996) ; see also Hoerl & McCormack (forthcoming) .
maps that represent general types of spatial arrangement. For instance, a budget hotel chain may have a map of the standard room layout they use, and there are anatomical atlases that show such things as maps of the human circulatory system. In other words, as a type of representation, maps are intrinsically neither particular nor general; they only become so if put to specific uses by us. The same, it seems, goes for causal models. I will call representations that share this feature 'generic', and I want to argue that being generic, in the sense just described, is a feature of representations that a subject can possess, and that allows that subject to be sensitive to the obtaining of certain relations in the absence of her possessing a concept of the relation in question.
For an argument to that effect, applied to the case of maps, we can again look to work by John Campbell. Campbell (1994) picks up on work in comparative psychology, where animals are sometimes described as having a 'cognitive map' of a certain terrain. An animal might be said to have a cognitive map of a maze, for instance, because it is able to find the shortest way back to a food source at a particular location in the maze independently of where in the maze it is put.
Campbell's question is in what sense an animal in possession of a cognitive map, thus described, can itself be said to appreciate the connectedness of space, i.e. the fact that all the places represented on the cognitive map are spatially related to each other, and whether its doing so involves explicit reasoning involving spatial concepts. Taking one particular type of account of a cognitive map (involving the technical notion of a centroid) as his example, Campbell argues that the animal is not using reflective thought about its targets to assign causal significance to spatial relations: it does this rather through the fact of its own engagement in the space.
[…] It is true that the vectors from the centroid to various cues do not depend on the location of the animal. But when we subtract the animal, we also subtract any physical meaning for those vectors.
The vectors get their meaning only when the animal is plugged in. They have causal significance only through their relations to the animal's perception and action (Campbell, 1994, p. 32) .
It seems to me that if it is legitimate to draw the type of distinction Campbell has in mind here in the case of cognitive maps, it should also be legitimate to draw a parallel distinction in the case of causal models. Roughly speaking, the idea would be that the grounds we might have for ascribing a causal model to a subject might not be sufficient for ascribing causal concepts to that subject, if the only way in which the model is put to use by the subject is in her own practical engagements with the world, without the subject herself being able to give significance to the idea that the same causal relations exploited in those practical engagements can also be present in circumstances in which there is no agent.
To make the issues at stake here more precise, it may help to note a difference between the kind of distinction I have in mind, between a purely practical grasp of causal relations and a capacity to employ causal concepts, and a perhaps similarsounding distinction drawn by James Woodward, whose own work makes use of causal models. Woodward (2007) distinguishes between three levels of causal understanding, or 'causal viewpoints', as follows:
( Woodward's distinctions are meant to capture one way in which a subject's causal understanding may be more or less sophisticated, depending on how closely tied up it is with the subject's own capacities to act. What matters for the distinction between an egocentric and a non-egocentric causal point of view, in Woodward's sense, is the type of information a subject can draw on in learning about causal relationshipswhether it can only learn about them from its own interventions and their outcomes, or whether it can also use information from situations in which it did not intervene itself.
There is, however, also another way in which a subject's causal understanding may be more or less sophisticated, depending on how closely tied up it is with the subject's own capacities to act. Meltzoff (1990) , for instance, 14-month-old children saw an adult touching the top of a box with his forehead, whereupon a light came on inside the box. They saw this action only once, and the box was removed as soon as the adult had performed the action, without giving the child the chance to touch the box herself. What Meltzoff found was that the 14-month-olds, when re-introduced to the box after one week's delay, reproduced the action they had seen the adult perform.
Meltzoff's particular interest lies in the connection between children's imitative abilities, as demonstrated in this study, and the development of what is
typically called a 'theory of mind', i.e., a capacity to reason about oneself and others using mental and action-concepts. One possible position one might take here is that imitative abilities require a theory of mind, in the sense of an ability, on the part of the child, to work out through reflective reasoning that the same action that she sees the adult perform is also within her ability. However, on the basis of studies such as the one described above, as well as others that demonstrate basic imitative abilities already in newborns, Meltzoff argues against this view. Rather, he takes such studies to provide evidence for the innate presence of a common mental code, i.e. an underlying set of neural representations coding for certain aspects of goal-directed actions that are activated both when a child carries out an action herself, and when she sees the same action being performed by another person.
Meltzoff likes to frame his own view in terms of the idea that children, more or less from birth, have a grasp of others as being 'like me', which is manifested in their imitative abilities. If the above is correct, however, it shows a way of understanding how a child might have a grasp of others being 'like me' that is not a matter of any ability, on the part of the child, to engage in reflective thought about the relationship between her own actions and those of others. Rather, in the case of imitation drawing on representations involving a common code for self-performed as well as observed actions, the child's grasp of the other as being 'like me' may be a purely practical one, in the sense that the only way in which the child can put such representations to use may be in her own practical engagements with the world. In other words, the child's sense of the other as being 'like me' may simply be exhausted by her ability to acquire certain pieces of practical knowledge through observation, e.g. how to activate the light-box in Meltzoff's (1990) experiment with 14-month olds.
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In a similar way, I would argue that there could possibly be a number of ways in which a subject might acquire practical knowledge from observation of naturally occurring events in the environment without necessarily engaging in reflective thought about the relationship between those events and her own actions. Thus, when it comes to Woodward's idea of a 'fully causal viewpoint', and the idea that a subject with such a viewpoint can grasp that the same relationship governing her own actions can also be present when no agent is involved, we can again distinguish between two forms such a grasp might take. The subject might be able to give substance to that sameness in reflective thought, or she might have a more basic, purely practical grasp of that sameness, which is simply exhausted by the ability to acquire practical knowledge through observation of naturally occurring events.
Causing and Preventing
In the preceding two sections, I have tried to bring into focus the question of what it is for a subject to possess causal concepts by highlighting two ways in which a subject might fall short of having such concepts despite being able to recognize or being sensitive to what are in fact causal phenomena. In the remainder of the paper, I will sketch a suggestion for an answer to the question as to what it is to possess causal concepts.
I shall take my lead from the final sentence of Anscombe's 'Causality and Determination', which runs: "The most neglected of the key topics in this subject are:
interference and prevention" (Anscombe, 1971, p. 258) . The main focus in what 8 I discuss the issues at stake here in more detail in Hoerl, 2002. follows will be on the notion of prevention, though I should make clear at the outset that I am treating this notion as an example of a larger class. My suggestion, put very briefly, is that ascribing a grasp of causal concepts to an individual is, at least in part, a matter of thinking of that individual as being able to engage in a distinctive type of causal reasoning, of which reasoning about how a certain outcome might be prevented provides an example. In this type of reasoning, causal relations are themselves being conceived of as subject to conditions, such that it is possible to ask how A might be prevented from causing B, how one might enable A to cause B, or how else the relationship between A and B might be interfered with, such that A might bring about one effect rather than another.
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To spell out this suggestion in more detail, it is important to distinguish between two quite different ways in which the notion of prevention might be understood. One of them is expressed in the following remark by Hitchcock:
In our interventions in the world, we typically seek to promote those outcomes that we deem desirable and to prevent or inhibit those outcomes that we wish to avoid. Thus, we typically aim to prevent or inhibit thrombosis, while we may seek either to prevent or promote pregnancy, depending on our desires at a particular stage in our lives.
[…] Unfortunately, our language can be treacherous here, for we often use the word cause specifically to mean promote. In this usage, cause and prevent (or inhibit) are antonyms.
Nonetheless, prevention is a kind of causal relationship (Hitchcock, 2007, p. 104).
Hitchcock's point is that causes can come in varieties that raise the chances of a certain outcome or varieties that lower the chances of a certain outcome, and that, for instance, the relationship between birth control pills and pregnancy is clearly a causal one, even though we ordinarily would not say that the former cause the latter. Within the framework used by Hitchcock, this ambiguity is resolved by distinguishing between preventing causes, which are conceived of as ones that lower the probability of a certain outcome, and promoting causes, which are conceived of as ones that increase the probability of the outcome.
The understanding of the notion of prevention at issue in Anscombe's 'Causality and Determination' is arguably very different from that just sketched. A key part of Anscombe's argument is that singular causal truths cannot be understood as instances of universal generalizations because, for any putative causal relationship between an event A and an event B, we can imagine a situation in which A happens, but B does not because of some further cause, and there is no way of limiting the number of such other causes that might prevent B from happening.
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Setting aside the issue as to what exactly this argument establishes about the relationship between causation and universal generalizations, it brings out that there is a further dimension to common-sense uses of the notion of prevention that Hitchcock glosses over. An understanding of the notion of prevention that is more complex than that captured by the idea of a preventing cause, understood along Hitchcock's lines, is expressed in sentences with a particular sort of grammatical structure, following the schema "A prevents B from x-ing C". (Indeed, pace Hitchcock, it is likely that we actually have a version of this schema in mind when we think of the relation between taking birth control pills and getting pregnant.) The grammatical structure here describes not a relationship between two events (or event types), such as that of one event's lowering the probability of another, but a relationship that obtains between an event (or type of event) and an occurrence of an instance (of a type) of causation. In what follows, I will mark that difference by speaking of the schema "A prevents B from x-ing C" as embodying the idea that causal relations are preventable.
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Now, one interesting feature of the schema "A prevents B from x-ing C" is that it can be filled using both the thin concept 'cause' or one of Anscombe's thick concepts to describe the prevented relationship between B and C. This might help us see a possible answer to a question we raised in connection with Anscombe's account, i.e. the question of what it is about a subject's ability to recognize instances of scraping, pushing, wetting, etc. in virtue of which the subject can be said to think of those instances in genuinely causal terms. One idea that Anscombe might avail herself of, in response to this question, is the idea that instances of wetting, pushing, scraping, etc. are thought of as causal by the subject in so far as the subject understands, for instance, that they are preventable (at least in principle), or that they can otherwise be interfered with.
Again, we can perhaps make this suggestion more concrete by looking at the two studies on children that I mentioned in the section on Anscombe's account. In
Gelman et al.'s study, children were able to match an outcome to an object with the right kind of causal power to produce that outcome. Having some kind of grasp of the causal powers of objects in this sense, though, might be possible without grasping that something might prevent the object from exerting its causal power, or how else the presence of other causes might affect the outcome. Das Gupta & Bryant's study, by contrast, whilst not specifically dealing with children's grasp of preventability, can nevertheless be seen as measuring their ability to appreciate the particular conditions that instances of causal relations may be subject to, such that, for example, whether an instance of pouring water over an apple produces a whole or a cut wet apple depends on what conditions the apple starts out in. Arguably, the reasoning here, involving a grasp of one sense in which a causal relationship can be interfered with, is structurally of the same type as that involved in grasping relations of preventability.
Consider next the issues I raised in the section on causal models. The key issue was that a subject may possess a causal model and yet fall short of possessing causal concepts, if the only way in which the causal model is put to use by the subject is in her own practical engagements with the world. How, if at all, might the question as to whether the subject can grasp the idea of the preventability of instances of causation be relevant here? Consider the relationship between two events (or event types) as represented within a causal model. There may actually be nothing about that representation (specifying certain counterfactual relationships between the two events) that the idea of something preventing one of them from causing the other could get any purchase on. 12 This is not to say that causal models are unable to represent a situation to which the schema "A prevents B from causing C" appliesdoing so within a causal model usually involves introducing a further variable in 12 The causal model might, of course, imply that we can, say, bring it about that the second event doesn't happen by bringing it about that the first event doesn't happen. But this is different from the notion of prevention as considered here, which is concerned with the question of how the second event might be prevented, even if the first does happen.
between B and C for A to influence. 13 Rather, the point here is that the thought that any causal relation is in principle preventable involves a substantial theoretical commitment that goes beyond what is implied by the information about counterfactual relationships captured by a causal map.
It is at this point, I believe, that the issues I have been raising connect in an interesting way with recent work on singular causation. I believe it is arguable that thought of causal relations as in principle preventable involves a commitment to a view of causation that is at least broadly of the same type as that advanced in recent philosophical accounts of singular causation, according to which singular causation involves, for instance, the interaction of continuous processes and the exchange of physical quantities such as energy or momentum (Salmon, 1984; Dowe, 2000) .
Following Schaffer (2004) , I will say that a common feature of such accounts is that they think of causes and effects as physically connected. It is this idea of a physical connection, however, that seems to be required to give substance to the thought that causal relations are in principle preventable. 14 Above, I said that thinking of causal relationships as preventable is an instance of a distinctive type of reasoning about causation in which causal relations are themselves being conceived of as being subject to certain conditions. The idea of a physical connection, of an empirical feature by which causes need to be connected to their effects, is precisely what is needed to ground the idea of such conditions, and thus for this type of reasoning to get a grip.
To summarize, then, I have suggested that there is a particular type of reasoning that a subject needs to be able to engage in if she is to be credited with causal concepts. In this type of reasoning, causal relations are themselves conceived of as being subject to certain conditions, such that it makes sense to ask how A might be prevented from causing B, how one might enable A to cause B, or how else the relationship between A and B might be interfered with. I have argued that there is a primitive ability to grasp the causal power of objects and there are abilities involving the use of a causal model that a subject can possess without being able to consider such questions and thus to think of causal relations as subject to conditions in this way. Conversely, I have tried to show that the latter abilities involve thought of causes and effects as being physically connected. Thus, if what I have argued is at least roughly along the right lines, having causal concepts turns on being able to engage in a type of reasoning that involves a commitment to the type of view of causal relations articulated by current singularist theories of causation.
